Review of Ch. 5-6 of Herbert Marcuse's "One Dimensional Man"

In chapters 5-6 of his book, Marcuse openly dialogues on the effect of

technological rationality on society. Marcuse asserts that scientific

rationality, the parent of technological rationality, has occupied an

ideological role within society, one which serves to uphold the dominant

interests. This is visible on many levels. He notes that what is called

‘rationality’ within society is actually irrational. It

is the hi-jz%@x*& of scientific method by vested interests, who intend

to use science and technology as a means of upholding a system of power

which subjects the vast majority of the earth’s inhabitants to complete

and utter servitude. In capitalist society, this means that technological

rationality has been used as a means of upholding the power of the

bourgeois class over that of the proletariat. Marcuse notes that the

more philosophical-centered notion of the dialectic was rejected on

these very grounds in favor of an all-encompassing mode of scientific

analysis and quantifiability. “[The philosopher] subjects experience to

his critical judgment, and this contains a value judgment – namely, that

freedom from toil is preferable to toil, and an intelligent life is

preferable to a stupid life. It so happened that philosophy was born

with these values. Scientific thought had to break this union of value

judgment and analysis, for it became increasingly clear that the

philosophic values did not guide the organization of society nor the

transformation of nature.” (126) It was also partly rejected on the

grounds that it did not accurately reflect the real conditions of life,

that philosophy was dissociated from the given material conditions of

reality and therefore divorced from the basis of effective action. In this

vein of discourse, logic, the source of scientific thought, had its

origins in humankind’s need to create what Marcuse calls ” theoretical

harmony out of actual discord, to purge thought from contradictions,

to hypostatize identifiable and fungible units in the complex process

of society and nature.” (137) Because the process itself is based on the

domination and control of nature, Marcuse argues that it is out of

line with the foundations of a peaceful society. He points out that

control over nature quickly leads to control over man, and that the

signs and symbols of the scientific-rational mode of thought have

simply become a means of quantifying nature into malleable units towards

an end which remains as-yet undefined. He notes that the dissociation of

scientific rationality from the ethics and values inherent in

philosophical thought makes it clear that science itself serves as a

value-system, or ideological worldview, which serves to uphold

a set of relations which are inherently oppressive to the working class.

The ideological structure of scientific rationality claims that the processes

which result in the quantification of nature and human beings into resources

and labour-power, respectively, represent the means toward the end of

continuous improvement in the standard of living of all people, and

therefore represents the sociological myth of progress. In reality it

is simply a process which makes the domination of some groups of

individuals by others more tolerable by improving the standard of

living of most, while enslaving them to the very system which creates

so many wonderful, useful “things”. Continuous technological advancement

ensures that individuals are more closely bound to the imperatives of

the system itself. Technology also enhances the repressive function of

society. Or, as Marcuse puts it, “In this universe, technology also

provides the great rationalization of the unfreedom of man and

demonstrates the ‘technical’ impossibility of being autonomous, of

determining one’s own life. For this unfreedom appears neither as

irrational nor political, but rather as submission to the technical

apparatus which enlarges the comforts of life and increases the

productivity of labor. Technological rationality thus protects rather

than cancels the legitimacy of domination, and the instrumentalist

horizon of reason opens on a rationally totalitarian society.” (159)

I essentially agree entirely with Marcuse’s analysis.

Marcuse describes science’s obsession with “objective” reality as

the great negation of Plato’s understanding of finite being as the

‘incomplete manifestation’ of ideal conditions, and subject to change;

the subjective qualities of the idealistic vision are merely the

unmanifested qualities of an existing potentiality which has yet

to be realized. I agree essentially with this idea, and I believe

that the ideological basis of scientific rationalism has a tendency

to limit the discourse on possible utopic alternatives, which may in

fact be possible to achieve through an understanding that a qualitative

change in human relations is possible.

Will capitalism be the final historical stage of antagonistic social relations?

Ever since the beginning of history, the master-slave relationship has perpetuated itself in various forms of social production. The earliest civilizations were civilizations based on the use of slave labour, and the social mode of production was organized in a hierarchical fashion with slaves at the bottom, and kings, emperors and other royal figures occupying the highest tiers. These relationships, needless to say, were relations of domination, the domination of one group of individuals over another. The systemic reality was that the vast majority of the civilized world were subjected to the ruling class. The basic configuration of society hasn't changed much in it's structural reality. A ruling class still exists, despite all proclamations to the contrary. The relations of production turned a major page during the industrial revolution, which saw the rise of a bourgeois class of capitalists. These capitalists replaced the ruling nobility of the earlier period as the dominant class, and of course they now had a basic level of control over the levers of government, which made them the dominant class. Now, people were free to move from job to job, but because of the nature of the system, the vest majority of people were forced to sell their land to the capitalist enterprises, who were growing in size and power. Small producers could not compete, and of course this spelled the end for independent producers, such as artisans. Today we see that larger corparations are also replacing the smaller ones, and large corporate conglomerates are the rule of the day. Anyhow, the worker was still forced to take part in the mode of production, but instead of being able to produce and sell his own products on the market, the growing technology involved in commodity production ensured that only the extremely wealthy would be able to seriously compete in most areas of global production. When the New World was discovered, this pattern was disrupted, as there was a shortage of workers, and plentiful natural resources. This meant that workers in the new world, because of it's small population and natural abundance, were well-compensated for their work. Small producers were once again able to find themselves in a climate that favoured competition. But once again the true rules of capitalism asserted themselves, and an oligopoly began to form among the world's largest producers, who continued to consume the smaller ones. Today, Corporations have considerable leverage over the world's governments, to a point where many speculate that the line between government and "big business" has been considerably blurred. The conditions for small businesses continue to deteriorate, and most small to medium-sized industries are now in serious peril, and have been for some time. What this has meant for the average worker is that he is forced to sell his labour to the capitalist in order to meet his needs, but most importantly, the considerable diminishment of global competition has intensified the power which capitalists now hold over the average worker. The globalization of production (a situation in which corporations can now threaten non-compliant governments, who say, want to raise the taxes for corporations in an effort to increase social spending, or minimum wage for workers, into following their dictates) means that governments who do not follow the dictates of these companies will likely find them moving to an area that has a more easily exploitable labour force. This situation has literally precipitated the recent economic meltdown, which has been long in the making, although it was delayed by the availability of cheap, easy credit, which kept the economy afloat. Anyhow, you can see how this sort of situation could easily snowball into a situation in which the global workforce is completely at the mercy of a greedy corporate oligarchy. Now I believe that any system based on exploitation is doomed for failure (mark my words), however, I wonder whether the end of capitalism will precipitate a new system which will have all the fundamental features of a free, even 'utopic' society, or whether the master-slave relationship will continue to be a dominant feature of human social relations, a reality rooted in the vastly differing interests of individuals and groups within society. What do you think? I look forward to your opinions.

How I would spend $10,000

New Clothes, an apartment, and healthy food. That's what I'd spend it on

Life is but a Dream

Life is but a Dream
By CanadianTheorist

Life is a strange phenomenon
That I can’t explain without resorting to mathematical formulas
Which won’t do justice to the mystery of it all.
Life is a metaphor.

Without the use of poetry, how could I describe
The vast, sprawling, expanding, organic thing
That is life?

I would rather say that as I read this, Life is
A combination of disparate elements
That are united by the mind,
By the imagination.

The nightmare of a dark night,
An endless despair,
How quickly it turns into tomorrow’s bright sunshine.
The sound of birds will quickly replace the sound
Of the wounded, the crippled, the maimed, the insane.

Oh, how strange this life is. How utterly wonderful and fantastic.
Even as I read this aloud, in my mind, I can picture the warm sunshine
Upon my face.

How then, could I ever despair
Knowing that I am part of an adventure, a puzzle, a beauty beyond measure,
Feeling the inspiration of the divine deep within my breast,
And enjoying the ride of a lifetime?

Another Essay - I love to post these - The Liberal State in Hobbes and Locke

The Liberal State and in Hobbes and Locke
By CanadianTheorist

Private property is a core component of the theoretical foundation of capitalism.

The role of the state in protecting property rights within liberal market societies are

clearly described in the political writings of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. The

works of both theorists have long been used as a justification for the liberal-

democratic state. According to this view, the need for civil society arises

out of the need to protect private property from the competitive interests

of individuals in the chaotic state of nature. Through the imposition and

enforcement of civil law, they believed that self-preservation could be

better protected than in the state of nature. This is because without

government, men would necessarily be insecure about their possessions,

and would be in a state of incessant conflict with each other for

survival. Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan, provides a more elaborate

description of men in the state of nature as engaged in the incessant

pursuit of power over others. However, the postulates which Hobbes and

Locke both call to point regarding man in the state of nature, particularly

the normative assumptions about man’s necessary struggle for power, are

drawn from a set of socially acquired characteristics in man. These

socially acquired traits are found only in men who belong topossessive

market societies. The understanding of Hobbes’s natural man as possessing

historically rooted and socially acquired characteristics opens up a new

understanding of the theories of both Locke and Hobbes regarding men in

civil society. Both theories are intrinsically rooted in historical

circumstances, and therefore the conclusions which both arrive at regarding

not only the state of mankind, but the nature of civil society, must be

understood only in the context of possessive market societies. Both are

meant to provide a framework for the orderly functioning of a possessive

market society.

The theories of both Hobbes and Locke may be properly understood as

providing the framework for responsible government in liberal market

societies. The basis of what constitutes civil society, for Locke, is

to establish and enforce laws which ensure the continued functioning

of the market. Locke states unequivocally that men establish laws

and a coercive authority for one end chiefly, which is ��the preservation

of their property” (352). What a man may call his property, according to

Locke, is “whatsoever … he removes out of the state that Nature

hath provided, and left it in, (which) he hath mixed his Labour

with, and (thereby) joined to it something that is his own” (288).

Therefore, Locke concludes that what meets the condition of a man’s

property is simply that which is the product of his labour. In

this sense, Locke is also pointing out, as Hobbes does also, that

a man’s labour is an alienable commodity. Hobbes also points this

out in chapter 24 of Leviathan when he says that “…a man’s labour (is

also) a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other

thing” (164). Because property is seen as a product of labour

power, there also must necessarily be a market in men’s labour.

In The Political Theory of Possessive Iindividualism, C. B. Macpherson

points out that the alienation of labour is required in order

to sustain this particular type of market economy, because

“without it, one of the essential features of modern competitive

market societies (i.e. the labour market) would be impossible”. The

understanding of property as an alienable commodity ensures that

it may be accumulated. Macpherson notes that “unless land and

resources can be transferred through a market, and so be combined

with labour in the most profitable way, full advantage cannot be

taken of the availability of labour.” (“Political”, 60). By

establishing this particular relationship between labour and the market,

competition is laid out as the necessary model for social relations

between individuals in the possessive market society, ensuring

a system whereby property may be accumulated and maintained.

The accumulation of property in the possessive market society

can only take place if land, resources and labour are alienable

commodities that can be traded in the market. The accumulation of

property allows for a net transfer of some men’s powers to others.

Macpherson points out that this transfer takes place because most

men have lost “free access to the means of turning their capacity

to labour into productive labour” (“Political, 57). In The Real

World of Democracy, Macpherson points out that because most people

do not have enough land or capital they must work on someone else’s.

This is because the

“accumulated capital, and the effective power to accumulate it” has

become concentrated

“in the hands of a relatively small number of persons” (42). Because

the vast majority of people have lost the basic right of access to the

means of production, most men “must continually sell the remainder of

their powers to those who have the land and capital, and must accept a

wage which allows part of the product to go to the owners of land and

capital” (57). In so doing, property rights uphold the dominant ethos

of individual competition which is woven deeply into the fabric of

capitalist society. The transfer between classes is maintained by

continual competition at all levels of society. “Everyone is a possessor

of something, if only his capacity to labour; all are drawn into the

market; competition determines what they will get for what they have

to offer” (“Political”, 57). Karl Marx was among the first intellectuals

to acknowledge that this net transfer of power was inherently oppressive

to an entire class of labourers in capitalist society. For Marx,

Private property, and the class antagonisms produced by the possessive

market economy, resulted in “new conditions of oppression, new forms of

struggle in place of the old ones” (“Communist”, 4). Marx pointed out

that historically, these struggles have resulted “either in a revolut-

ionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the

contending classes” (3). The notion of class struggle, which is based on

Marx’s writings, originated as a critique of the system of net transfer

which is upheld by the liberal state. In order to contain class struggle

within acceptable limits, and therefore maintain existing power relations,

a coercive power is needed. The possessive market society, which is based

on a net transfer of power, must ensure the use of coercion through the

state in order to maintain the dominance of the capitalist ruling class.

Insofar as states exist to maintain this power arrangement, they also

contribute to class antagonism, a type of social disorder, which would

not be possible without the existence of a liberal Government.

By examining the role of the state as put forth by Hobbes and

Locke, it becomes clear that the liberal state exists to maintain

a certain type of order which is required for the continuance of

the net transfer. The need for the state is commonly justified

through a view of human nature which is found in the theories of

both Hobbes and Locke, both of which see men in their natural

state as necessarily involved in the incessant pursuit of power.

According to Hobbes, mankind is characterized by a “perpetual and

restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death”.

Despite Hobbes’s analysis of human nature, it is clear that man’s

endless appetite for power is a socially acquired characteristic,

not a natural one. Hobbes notes that the reason for man’s ceaseless

appetite for power is “because he cannot assure the power and means

to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more”

(66). According to Macpherson, this can only be the case in a society

in which men’s social relations are necessarily competitive. Macpherson

postulates that the natural man which Hobbes describes is not uncivilized

man in the state of nature, but “is a deduction from the appetites and

other faculties not of man as such but of civilized men” (“Political”, 29).

This is because Hobbes is describing the characteristics not of

natural man, but of men who must continually seek power by selling

his private property on the market. “In the fundamental matter of

getting a living” Macpherson points out that “all individuals are

essentially related to each other as possesors of marketable

commodities, including their own powers. All must continually

offer commodities (in the broadest sense) in the market, in

competition with others” (55). When we consider the existence

of a universal labour market as a defining characteristic of

the possessive market economy, and we understand a man’s labour

to be his private property, the competitive relations which Hobbes

is referring to become perfectly clear. Since the market is universal,

and there is no authoritative allocation of work or rewards for work,

all men are in constant competition to meet only the most basic of

needs, and to maintain even their current level of power. Hobbes’s

theory of natural man was therefore based not on man in the state of

nature, but on deductions made from the observation of men in

necessarily social relations which are competitive.

As Macpherson has pointed out, the conditions of the

possessive market require a net transfer of some men’s powers

to others, and continual competition among social men. As

noted above, Hobbes’ natural man must be understood not as

a man in the state of nature, but rather one who must

consistently compete with other men in the possessive

market, a social being involved in social relations. The

possessive market society necessarily produces social

relations which are more thoroughly and universally

competitive than in any other society at any point in human

history, so far as we may be aware. Macpherson has pointed

out that the exchange of commodities “permeates the relations

between individuals, for in this market all possessions, including

men’s energies, are commodities” (55). The postulate that all

men desire limitless power, as we have seen, is therefore tenable

only in the possessive market society. It is only tenable about

those “who are already in a universally competitive society” (45).

Armed with this understanding, we can begin to examine the liberal

state not only as an instrument of order, but one which creates

and maintains a highly competitive society, and consequentially,

also a type of disorder. The possessive market, in upholding the

net transfer of power from the working class to the ownership

class, also creates and perpetuates class antagonism. The

alienation which occurs among the working class, alienation

from their labour, and from the products of their labour, is a

product of this fiercely competitive environment. Marx notes that

“the modern labourer, instead of rising with the progress of

industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of

existence of his own class” (19). This is to say that the

working class is involved in relations in which he sees his

political and economic power appropriated by the owners

of private industry. These oppressive power relations must be

upheld by the state coercively. As Macpherson has demonstrated,

the state exists “to maintain a set of relations between

individuals and groups within the society which are power

relations” (“Real”, 39). Marx goes so far as to say that the

modern liberal state “is but a committee for managing the common

affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (“Communist”, 6). The

relations which Macpherson and Marx credit the state with upholding

are those concerned with the maintenance of private property and

it’s accumulation through the market. In maintaining order to protect

the capitalist market, the state also plays a major role in perpetuating

a system of socio-economic inequality. As a consequence, the order

which is imposed through liberal democracy, and other liberal

forms of government, act to entrench various forms of class

struggle in the society, and therefore to create, entrench, and

deepen the antagonisms between various socio-economic and minority

groups.

In order to maintain, as has been put forth, a system of

orderly net transfer, Hobbes and Locke both recognize the need

for a coercive apparatus in government which will enforce

contracts through the legal system. The liberal state exists,

and is specifically well-suited for this function, insofar

as it exists to protect and enforce property rights, and

in so doing, to uphold the market, including the net

transfer of power. This is because, as Hobbes notes in Leviathan,

that if a contract is made in the state of nature, where there

is no coercive power to enforce either party’s compliance, then

the contract is void. There can be no means of assuring that

either party will perform his part of the bargain. “But if

there be a common power set over them both” with right and force

sufficient to compel performance, it is not void” notes Hobbes.

He goes on to point out that agreements by themselves, without

the enforcement mechanism of government, “are too weak to bridle

men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the

fear of some coercive power” (91). Hobbes later notes that it

is the coercive power of government which preserves property

rights and therefore maintains the structure of the possessive

market economy. He notes that where there is “no [property],

there is no injustice; and where there is no coercive power

erected, that is, where there is no commonwealth, there is no

propriety; all men having right to all things: therefore where

there is no commonwealth, there nothing is unjust” (96). Locke

points out that a coercive power is needed “with an intention

in every one the better to preserve himself his Liberty and

Property” (353). The property rights which are necessary to

the legal system of the liberal state, as Macpherson has

pointed out, exist to protect the net transfer of power

towards the ownership society. The liberal state, with

or without the democratic franchise, must necessarily be

dominated by the interests of the capitalist ruling class,

and it’s decisions must generally conform to those interests,

which are generally synonymous with those of big business.

Robert Reich, Bill Clinton’s former labour secretary,

points out that “business is in complete control of the

machinery of government” (Borger, par. 18). John Dewey went

so far as to conclude that “politics is the shadow cast on

society by big business.” (Dewey, p. 440) It would appear then,

that the state acts as a coercive mechanism which is more or less

under the influence of the dominant interests in the market system,

specifically guided in it’s decisions by the owners of the

means of production. Owing entirely to the net transfer, the

liberal state is a “double system of power” in the sense that

the relations which it upholds “are themselves power relations”

(“Real”, 42). The state must enforce the stability of relations

which are oppressive to an entire class of people, and which, by

their very nature, are antagonistic to the vast majority of it’s

population. In so doing, the liberal state creates it’s own

opposition in the working class, who will necessarily oppose

the net transfer of power to the capitalist ruling class.

In conclusion, insofar as the liberal state is vested

with the goal of maintaining order in the possessive market

society, it is also responsible for accompanying forms of

social disorder, which are associated with the competitive

nature of the market system. The net transfer and the

fundamental competitiveness of the system serve to create

and perpetuate internal forms of conflict, of which the

most obvious, according to Marx, is that arising between

the working class and the bourgeoisie. But class antagonism

is merely a symptom of the competitive market made manifest.

Hobbes’s natural man, who is imbued with the socially acquired

characteristic of competition, is merely a reflection of the

oppressive relations inherent in the capitalist system, a

system of exploitation which is upheld by the liberal state.





Bibliography

Borger, Julian. “All the president's businessmen”, April 27, 2001. The Guardian.

Guardian.co.uk. Manchester. 29 Jan, 2008.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/bush/story/0,,479212,00.html>

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. J. C. A. Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1996.

Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Ed. Peter Laslett. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2005.

MacPherson, C. B. The Real World of Democracy. Toronto: CBC, 1965.

Marx, Karl. The Communist Manifesto. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2004.

---. The Political theory of Possessive Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1962.

Westbrook, Robert B. John Dewey and American Democracy. Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1993.

Canadian Multiculturalism

Canada is known as one of the most multicultural nations in the world, and to a

degree, this is quite true. The effect of multiculturalism on Canada’s broader

political structure has been markedly different than in many industrialized na-

tions. This is largely because multiculturalism is deeply entrenched in the

political system through policy, and holds a significant place in Canadian

political dialogue. There are numerous reasons why Canada must embrace multi-

culturalism. Among these are Canada’s diverse ethnic makeup, owing to centuries

of international migration, as well as Quebec’s distinct cultural position within

Canada. Multiculturalism thus exists as a policy response to a very real multi-

cultural society. It is important to distinguish, however, that cultural diversity

in Canada exists only in relation to a dominant Anglo-centric culture which has

characterized the Canadian political and economic system since before confederation.

Multiculturalism, in this context, appears through the lens of the dominant culture

as an anomaly to an otherwise homogeneous system of values and norms According to

this dominant ethos, multiculturalism exists at the expense of national unity because

of an inherent conflict between the normative values of multiculturalism and those

of western liberal democracies. This particular interpretation of multiculturalism

is evident in the Canadian government’s multiculturalism policy, and is reflective

of the inequalities which ethnic minorities face in Canada’s political and economic

system. It is the intent of this paper to examine the perceived conflict between

ethnic minority groups and the dominant national values in order to determine the

relationship between the normative, western-oriented discourse and the experienced

marginalization of minority cultures.

In order to examine the relationship between multiculturalism and the dominant

culture in Canada, it is important to understand the basis of multiculturalism pol-

icy. Canada’s multiculturalism policy has hinged on a diversity in ethnic origins

and cultural influences. Canada’s population consists of a diverse ethnic backgr-

ound. The 2006 census revealed of Canada’s population of 31.2 million, six million

people were foreign-born, and is seeing the highest ratio of immigrant influx

“since the 1930s” (“One-fifth”). In addition to recent immigrants, Native Canadians

make up a significant part of Canada’s ethnic diversity. In the 1986 census, the

“Aboriginals” category had grown “to reach over 700, 000” (Krótki and Reid, 19).

Canada’s unique composition of immigrants and ethnic groups means that the dominant

political and cultural groups are constrained to respect the rights of several min-

ority groups. The diversity of Canada’s ethnic groups is also reflected in the dem-

ography of Canadians who speak a non-official language. Approximately two and a

half million people speak a mother tongue other than English or French (Krótki and

Reid, 29). The level of Canadian cultural diversity has proven to make assimilation

into a dominant ‘Canadian’ culture difficult due to the sheer volume of dissenting

voices. Chief among these dissenting voices, at least in terms of it’s population

size, has been the French Canadian community in Canada.

The unity of Canada has depended more or less, at various times, on the reco-

gnition of the distinct French-Canadian culture which exists in Quebec. The majority

of French-Canadians resided in Lower Canada, in what is now known as modern day

Quebec, since before confederation. Lower Canada had been ceded to Great Britain at

the time as a result of it’s defeat in the Seven Years’ War, and was therefore under

the control of Britain as a colony. However, in 1774, the British Parliament passed

the Quebec Act, which made numerous cultural concessions to French-Canadians living

in Lower Canada, including the affirmation of the right to practice Catholicism, and

the continued use of the French code civile as the basis of private law. The Act was

passed largely out of fears borne out of the American Revolution. The British inten-

tion was at least partially to “ensure the allegiance of the clerical and civil

leaders” of Quebec’s population (Brooks, 384). Whatever the intention, the Quebec

Act was an official recognition by the British crown of the distinct culture of

French-Canadians living in Lower Canada. Later, the British North America Act would

grant a level of regional autonomy through provincial government, while maintaining

a centralized model of government. In doing so, the BNA Act “implied an official

recognition of the political and cultural rights of the people of French origin”

(Library of Parliament, 2). The political significance of French-Canadian culture

was thus acknowledged by the Canadian government since confederation, with important

implications for Canadian multiculturalism policy.

The relationship between multiculturalism policy and the Quebec question became

well-known with the establishment of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bi-

culturalism in 1962. The committee was established with the goal of examining “the

issue of identity among Canadians” in response to inequalities among cultural and

ethnic groups. The committee believed that by relieving French/English tensions,

they could more effectively respond to pressures for cultural diversity within

Canada. They would do this by conceiving of a “bilingual framework within which

other ethnic groups could prosper” (Mahtani, 4). The committee’s recommendations

led to the Official Languages Act of 1969 which would recognize French as Canada’s

second language, as well as reform in the educational system which meant that both

languages would be taught to students that showed interest. In addition, grants

were made to various cultural groups to fund the preservation and enhancement of

Canada’s cultural heritage. Many languages besides French and English were also

now taught in schools when enough students showed an interest.

The dialogue which has resulted from the diversity of Canadian culture, as well

as the policy imperative of multiculturalism, has not developed without conflict.

In fact, the conflict between minority cultures which represent Canada’s ethnic

diversity and a dominant Anglophone culture has continued to define Canada as a

distinctly multi-cultural society. This conflict takes many forms. Native Canadi-

ans, historically one of Canada’s most disadvantaged cultural groups, have contr-

ibuted a robust criticism of Canada’s dominant cultural regime. Native Canadians

have regarded Western culturethrough a multifaceted perspective on what might be

regarded as a “special relationship with their environment”. Georgina Tobac’s

describes this relationship: “Every time the white people come to the North or

come to our land and start tearing up land, I feel as if they are cutting our

own flesh because that is the way we feel about our land. It is our flesh.”

(Berger, 84). By noting the significance of the connection between Native culture

and the land, one might see the connection between the perspective of normative

Native cultural values Native and the broader environmental movement. The signi-

ficance of Native culture thus takes on a perspective which is arguably counter-

hegemonic, in that it demonstrates a significant conflict with entrenched notions

of political economy. Criticisms leveled against the dominant liberal political

economy present a strong argument against any notion of Canadian unity.

Another major source of such criticism reveals itself in systemic discrimi-

nation based on ethnicity, a major problem for individuals of ethnic minority

background across Canada, by creating and perpetuating the myth of “racialized”

individuals and groups. The problem is described accurately by M. Reza Nakhaie

as systemic “inequities” which are “grounded in present and past racism and

discrimination” (par. 7). A Marxist-structuralist analysis of these inequities

reveals that they are the product of racial-ization, which results in societal

class divisions. Vic Satzewich points out that racism “emerged as an ideology

that justified the allocation of human beings to particular positions in class

relations as the reserve army of labour, or as part of a cheap-labour fraction

of the working class” (257). He goes on to point out, however, that racialization

is not necessarily imposed from above, by a dominant bourgeoisie, but exists

as a set of perceptions that “have their basis in real material conditions of

existence”. He quotes Stuart Hall by pointing out that racism “represents the

attempt to ideologically to construct the conditions, contradictions and prob-

lems” between various classes and groups in society “in such a way that they

can be dealt with and deflected in the same moment” (258). Regardless of where

racism begins, it is clear that inequalities based on ethnicity and gender are

increasingly a systemic problem. Wallace Clement notes that Canadian society,

“as in many modern societies built on conquest and immigration” has interwoven

ethnicity into a system of social stratif-ication so that it provides advantages

“to the conquerors while keeping the conquered and newly-arrived at the bottom

of the so called “opportunity structure” (163) Structural inequalities are apparent

in examining the difference in levels of pay between immigrants and non-immigrants

in Canada. One study, which included an analysis of the 2001 census “confirms that

ethno-racial groups' income varies according to whether individuals are Canadian

or foreign born, the immigration period, and the group involved” (Nakhaie, par. 6).

The study pointed out that immigrants from non-European countries earned far less

than those from English or French-speaking countries. In addition, ethno-racial

minorities were acknowledged as generally achieving higher education levels, yet

were “statistically less likely to appear in the upper income groups or to work

in the types of occupations to which such educational credentials usually lead”

(Nakhaie, par. 5). It is obvious that these inequalities exist as part of a

broader systemic inequality which is based on the exploitation of ethnic minor-

ities.

It is clear that inequalities remain entrenched in Canadian society. The

question that comes to mind, then, is to what extent multiculturalism policy

supports multiculturalism. To answer this first question, we must ask another one.

If Canada is a multicultural society, with strong political support for ethnic

pluralism, why do these inequa-lities exist on the scale that they do? The quest-

ion is a complex one, no doubt, but Nakhaie points out that the answer lies in

the conflict generated by the competing ideologies of individualism and collectivism.
As a liberal democracy, Canada embraces individualism. He points to the existence

of “a powerful ideology embedded in every aspect of Canadian society [which] promotes

free enterprise and individualism” as being the dominant ideology (par. 13). Anne

Phillips notes that this ideology provides a normative basis for the definition of

what forms of culture are acceptable within liberal multicultural societies. She

quotes David Scott, who points out that “most [political scientists] are less

interested in culture per se than in identifying a culture-concept that best

suits their political theory of liberal democracy” (qtd. in 21). She also

depicts the naturalization process as one of imposing liberal, individualistic

values on the immigrant population. Phillips describes this process as carrying

a degree of coerciveness which is used on immigrants “to make it clearer that

they have opted for the values of their host society (usually assumed to be more

liberal and democratic than those of the society they left)” (22). It is important

to note, however, that the recognition of the collective disadvantage of minority

groups was what led to pressure to create multiculturalism legislation. As Phillips

points out, ““It was the recognition of unequal power relations between majority

and minority groups, and the perception that states can unfairly disadvantage

citizens from minority groups when they impose a unitary political and

legal framework, that first gave impetus to the arguments for multiculturalism”

(Phillips, 18). The question remains, as to what extent multiculturalism policy

has served to address the goals of a multicultural society.

It is clear that multiculturalism policy in Canada, to some extent, has

served to obfuscate the original grievances of minority ethnic groups. From a

policy perspective, Canadian multiculturalism has become less clear as a policy

goal in light of a perceived conflict in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,

between the collective rights granted in section 27 and the guarantees of

equality under the law guaranteed in section 15. These represent “two very

different approaches to equality” ( Pask, 127). Section 15 guarantees that

“every individual is equal before and under the law … without discrimination

based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sxw, age, or

mental or physical disability” (Dewing and Leman, par. 23). Because of it’s

focus on individual rights, section 15 is therefore more aligned with

ideological liberalism. Section 27, however, states that the Charter

“shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and

enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians” and is therefore

more consistent with the goals of multiculturalism policy (Dewing and

Leman, par. 22). It should be noted that the values of individual equality

which are espoused in section 15, and more broadly applied to the liberal

political and economic structure of Canada, pose a challenge to the

realization of the goals of a multicultural society in Canada. Nakhaie

notes that multiculturalism policy tends to “clash with the idea that

rewards should be allocated on the basis of individual efforts and tend

to be rejected on that basis.” He goes on to note that liberal ideals

“contrast the ideas of social justice, equality of outcome, and empowerment”

(par. 14). This conflict also takes the form of what Lance W. Roberts and

Rodney A. Clifton refer to as the conflict between “negative” and “positive

freedoms”. As a liberal democracy, Canada is more concerned with providing

negative freedoms, that is, the freedom from arbitrary discriminatory practices,

than it is with enhancing positive freedoms, that is, the empowerment of

ethnic groups “to pursue and express their interests”. This sort of policy

framework thus works as a protection against structural change, ensuring that

some needs of ethnic groups are met as long as they are “consistent with the

existing institution-alized structures” (138). In other words, Canadian

multiculturalism exists only to the extent that it does not interfere with

the operation of a market-based society.

It is clear that Canada continues to exist as a multicultural society,

that is, as a society which is characterized by “adherence to a system or

a theory which values having many cultures within a society” (Magsino and

Singh, 80). And yet it is also true that the acceptable expression of

cultural values must fall within the acceptable frame-work of liberal

societies, a framework which is inherently oppressive to ethnic minority

culture. While Canada is a multicultural society, therefore, the question

remains as to what extent cultural expression is limited by the homogeniz-

ing effect of liberal democracy.



Bibliography

Berger, Thomas R. “The Persistance of Native Values”. Ethnicity and Ethnic

Relations in Canada. Ed. Jay E. Goldstein and Rita M. Bienvenue.

Toronto: Butterworth & Co. Ltd., 1980.

Clement, Wallace. “The Canadian Corporate Elite: Ethnicity and Inequality of

Access”. Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Canada. Ed. Jay E. Goldstein

and Rita M. Bienvenue. Toronto: Butterworth & Co. Ltd., 1980.

Dewing, Michael and Marc Leman. “Canadian Multiculturalism”. 16 Mar, 2006

Political and Social Affairs Division, Library of Parliament. 17 Dec, 2007

<http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/936-e.htm#

acanadian>

Magsino, Romulo, and A. Singh. “Toward a Multicultural Education in

Newfoundland and Labrador”. Phase I Report for the Secretary of State

Department. Ottawa, 1986.

Krótki, Karol J. and Colin Reed. “Demography of Canadian Population by Ethnic

Group”. Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape. Ed. J.

W. Berry and J. A. LaPonce, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.

Nakhaie, M. Reza. “Contemporary Realities and Future Visions: Enhancing

Multiculturalism in Canada”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. 2006. Vol. 38

Issue 1, p149-158, 10p. <http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.auc.ca

/ehost/detail?vid=1&hid=112&sid=06fee*******8-497d-8a1e-

b4f448e8352a%40sessionmgr106>

Mahtani, Minelle. “Interrogating the Hyphen-Nation: Canadian Multicultural

Policy and ‘Mixed Race’ Identities”. Mar. 2002, Social Identities. Vol. 8

Issue 1, p67-90, 24p; DOI: 10.1080/*******0*******26. 17 Dec, 2007.

<http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.auc.ca/ehost/pdf?vid=1&hid=116&si

d=ba17a980-ae5a-4dfd-8a11-5d3a39f4a733%40sessionmgr104>

“One Fifth of Canadians Immigrants”. 5 Dec, 2007. BBC News. BBC News.uk.

London. 17 Dec, 2007. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7128

172.stm>

Pask, E. Diane. “The Charter, Human Rights, and Multiculturalism in Common-

Law Canada”. Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape.

Ed. J.W. Berry and J. A. LaPonce. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,

1994.

Roberts, Lance W. and Rodney A. Clifton. “Multiculturalism in Canada: A

Sociological Perspective”. Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada. Ed. Peter

S. Li. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Saouab, Abdou. “Canadian Multiculturalism”. 14 April 1993. Research Branch,

Library of Parliament. 19 p.

Satzewich, Vic. “The Political Economy of Race and Ethnicity”. Race and Ethnic

Relations in Canada. Ed. Peter S. Li. Toronto: Oxford University Press,

1990.

Fetishistic Scopophilia in "The Bloody Chamber"

I've decided to put a couple examples of my essays on the blog for the purpose of discussion and/or praise/criticism. I look forward to hearing what you all have to say.



A socialist psychoanalytic analysis must explore the neurotic behaviour and

thought processes within the individual, and conversely, analyze these processes in

terms of the interplay between the fabric of social consciousness and the ideological

superstructure of society. The linear social processes of modern capitalism, which are

said to be based upon the relations of the mode of production, are symptoms of the

neurotic objectification typical of fetishism. The consequent neurosis of the social

organism is facilitated through hegemonic forms of western culture, and is therefore an

inherent property in the interaction between the individual elements of western capitalist

society. The characteristically obsessive behaviours and thought patterns which are

typical of fetishism emerge as a response to the culturally normalized, often repetitive

stimuli that have reinforced such idealizations. In psychoanalysis, the potential of the

conscious ego to misinterpret the unconscious is what allows the fetish to exist and order

our lives as it has. The effect is easily demonstrated through the repetition of a symbolic

object in a cultural context. The relationship between the symbol and the context is often

a social construct, either partially or absolutely. Through drastic reductionism, the

subject’s response to a concept or image often takes the form of an obsessive compulsion

in seeking to replace the original concept, as conceived by ego, with an artificially

constructed “other”. The cultural processes which result from the intertwining of social

consciousness with symbolic representation, that which Freud referred to as the uncanny,

produces a sustained but distorted relationship between the ego and the id. These

relations profoundly alter associations within the unconscious as the subject becomes

socialized during childhood. The superego, in this sense, becomes a profoundly limiting

force through the normalization of the uncanny. The resulting neurotic condition is the

product of a newly constructed and limiting idealization, with the effect of obscuring a

conscious perception of neurosis within individual behaviour and institutional structure.

The relationship between the ego and the unconscious drives, which are reduced to the

level of the uncanny, perpetuate a repressive idealization of sexuality within society. On

an individual level, neurotic expression is reflected in the relationship between the

subject and the fetish object, whose objectification is often the manifestation of a

dysfunctional obsession. The nature of these relationships are explored in Angela Carter’s

The Bloody Chamber. Carter demonstrates how the nature of the altered relationship

becomes manifest in the obsession of fetishistic objectification.

The effect of the uncanny on the unconscious mind is that it produces in the

subject the illusion of a repressed fantasy. The fantasy which is created through this

substitution of the real for the imagined is then projected on an objectified other. This

process of fetishization reproduces, for the subject, elements “of the infantile anxiety

from which the majority of human beings have never become quite free” (532). Freud

muses that the “uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the distinction between

imagination and reality is effaced, as when something that we have hitherto regarded as

imaginary appears before us in reality, or when a symbol takes on the function of the

thing it symbolizes” (528). The projection of manufactured fantasies is significant in the

popular culture of western societies, particularly where popular media creates the image

of a perfect “other” as the basis of an idealization of sexual expression. What has been

produced by the perfection of the uncanny effect, in the age of modern technology, has

been a system of propaganda whereby consent is manufactured, largely due to social

atomization, which is an effect of the misplaced anxiety associated with sexual

repression. This particular neurosis perpetuates itself throughout the framework of the

entire human consciousness. The function of the symbolic in narrative cinema, for

example, allows for “the projection of the repressed desire [of exhibitionism] onto the

performer”. Mulvey also notes that the basis for looking at another person as an object

“…can become fixated into a perversion, producing obsessive voyeurs and Peeping Toms

whose only sexual satisfaction can come from watching, in an active controlling sense, an

objectified other” (Mulvey, 1174). The presence of the uncanny in popular culture,

however, did not begin in the age of mass production. It’s presence in more traditional

forms has been encapsulated in the traditional fairy tales and popular story-telling of the

past.

Carter’s collection of short stories reveals the symptoms of neurosis inherent in

the fetishization process, as represented primarily through the objectification of the

female protagonist in The Bloody Chamber. The aristocrat whom the protagonist marries

depends, for the fulfilment of his repressed fantasy, on the “otherness” of the narrator.

From the beginning, the narrator is aware of her objectification, and declares “I saw him

watching me in the gilded mirrors with the assessing eye of a connoisseur inspecting

horseflesh, or even of a housewife in the market, inspecting cuts on the slab” (Carter, 11).

This example of fetishistic scopophilia clearly “projects [male] fantasy onto the female

figure” (Mulvey, 1175). At the point in which the female protagonist notices her future

husband watching her, the passive scopophilia in which the male character is engaged

also becomes an active, controlling gaze in which the protagonist becomes aware of her

passive role in her fiancé’s fantasy. “In glancing away from him” says the

narrator/protagonist, “I caught sight of myself in the mirror. And I saw myself, suddenly,

as he saw me, my pale face, the way the muscles in my neck stuck out like thin wire. I

saw how much that cruel necklace became me” (Carter, 11). At this moment of

recognition, the narrator becomes aware that she is the central object of a language of

phallocentric desire which transcends fetishistic scopophilia. She is now the object of a

markedly voyeuristic investigation and subsequent demystification of the fetish object, a

foreshadowing of the sadistic fantasy which the male character requires, through his

repression and obsessive fetishism. As Mulvey points out, “voyeurism… has associations

with sadism: pleasure lies in ascertaining guilt (immediately associated with castration),

asserting control and subjugating the guilty person through punishment or forgiveness”

(1177). The fantasy is carried to it’s unrestrained conclusion up to the point where she is

about to be decapitated by her husband as punishment for entering the bloody chamber.

While scopophilia and voyeurism remain two important aspects of the interplay

between the subject and the fetish-object, the linearity of fetishism does not constrain it’s

ultimate beginning and ending from the deviation of sado-masochistic interplay. The

example which Zizek poses of courtly love as a manifestation of phallocentric control

provides a stunning example of the ultimately illusory character of the fetishistic fantasy.

Zizek asserts that “The idealization of the Lady, her elevation to a spiritual, ethereal

Ideal, is … to be conceived of as a strictly secondary phenomenon: it is a narcissistic

projection whose function is to render her traumatic dimension invisible” (1182). The

subject, in seeming to overvalue the lady to the level of the transcendental signified, robs

her of her humanity and subsequently devalues her. In further analysis, this process is

functions principally as another dimension in the process of voyeuristic fetishization.

This occurs in the sense that the usually male masochist presents to the dominatrix, or

unattainable lady, the highly controlled illusion of false masochism, whereby the master

allows himself to become humiliated under conditions which are explicitly within his

own dominion. This complex interplay between subject and fetish-object in The Bloody

Chamber appears most notably when he walks up behind her while she is playing piano

and surprises her with a box of marrons glacés. Although after the first surprise she

knows he is behind her, she is “forced to mimic surprise, so that he would not be

disappointed” (8). The narcissistic character of the act of love becomes apparent, in this

case, as it becomes reduced to the level of fetishistic enterprise. It is clear that the subject

assumes a degree of control over the fetish object in his role as “puppet master” (39).

The subject reveals the truly illusory nature of the fetish-object in reminding the

protagonist that “Anticipation is the greater part of pleasure” (15). The control and

demystification of the object’s abstract sexuality ultimately unmasks the illusion which

has been constructed through sexual repression.

Carter’s work exemplifies the extremity of a prevalent hegemonic representation

of sexuality. The interpretation of sexual expressions in the work are based largely on the

nature of fetishization which, when speaking in terms of linear expression, has

implications which conceivably transcend sexuality in scope. It is clear that sexual

repression perpetuates, to some degree, a neurosis which further limits the ability to

transcend oppressive social constructs such as the commonly dogmatic interpretation of

gender and sexual identity. What has truly prevented liberation from these highly

archaic forms has been the continued presence of the uncanny as an ideal of sexual

gratification which remains unattainable.





























Deluce 7

Bibliography

Carter, Angela. The Bloody Chamber. Toronto: The Penguin Group Canada,

Inc., 1993.

Freud, Sigmund. “The ‘Uncanny’”, Trans. Under the supervision of Joan Riviere.

The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporary Trends. Ed.

David H. Richter. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007. 514-532.

Mulvey, Laura. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”. The Critical Tradition:

Classic Texts and Contemporary Trends. Ed. David H. Richter. Boston:

Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007. *******80.

Zizek, Slavoj. “Courtly Love, or, Woman as Thing”. The Critical Tradition:

Classic Texts and Contemporary Trends. Ed. David H. Richter. Boston:

Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007. *******97.

Poetry to unknown woman.

I wrote this poem for an woman who I will not name, she is beautiful. I had to write this for her becaue she was really down on herself about her looks, and her self esteem was low. Anyways here it is:

Meg thought she was not the coolest
But really her eyes told the full story.
She was like Cleopatra,
An element of nature.

All of the world would bend to her will.
She didn’t realize that she had this special gift
Because she used it everyday
And simply forgot it was there.

And even though her smile would light up a room,
And she was one of the best nature had to offer,
I could never forget the time that she questioned her own divinity.
I couldn’t help but laugh at the idea of it.

Roses will be roses, and violets violets
But Meg is as beautiful and changing as the blue sky.
On such a plane she could rise above the earthly strife
And create her own reality.




Nice one eh! She felt better after that.

Agnes

Agnes Janet Orville had lots of love to give to the world
Too bad she was wrong about God’s home being above the clouds.
She didn’t know what I figured aloud,
The truth between her ears, she was sitting on a gold mine.
I knew from the start that she was a smiler, too.

And in my spare time I dabble in poetry sometimes. I am a poet.

This one's called Agnes.





The web of intrigue in this case, included the holy creator,
He was everywhere, floating in white satin silk,
she saw him floating on her children’s smiles,
A stay-at home Mom with an amazing selection of products.
She looked like she was trying really hard to hold it all together

I love her look, like an ape, but only human,
A sort of strange breed, and yet just like the rest.
With her money, I saw her buying green vegetables like spinach.
Grown in a vegetable garden. No pesticides.
.
Not with the conviction of a prophet, nor the message of one,
But maybe that’s open to interpretation.
She forgot that we are all a part of it,
Have to look again, is it always the same?

What if everything exists and all is true?
Agnes is right. She is so wise
This housewife from the desert plains,
She knows more than we do.