Perhaps I'll be safe here (Page 9)

axocanth: "Frankly, it seems rather preposterous to me to claim that water freezing at 32F is science while simultaneously pitching a Multiverse theory in which, somewhere, Richard Dawkins is Pope of the Catholic Church and Sam Harris is voted the Sexiest Man Alive, as also science!!"

- JX




Haha! Very funny . . . but also very true!

Anyone who takes LITERALLY the notion of the philosophers' "Possible Worlds" in semantics, or the scientists' "Many Worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics, -- and some people explicitly DO -- has to accept the reality of the scenarios above.

Of course, there are also possible worlds where the Wireclub science forum isn't full of people calling each other liars and cheats, while Vianna and I sip a mango smoothie on a tropical beach somewhere.

It's not all bad news. More seriously though . . .



If there's one thing I've learned in all my foolish years it is that perhaps the only true generalization that can be made about science is that no true generalizations can be made about science.

Was it Mark Twain who said "All generalizations are false . . . including this one"?



Day-in, day-out we see people in places like this making blanket statements of the form:

"Science is all about X", and

"Science has nothing to do with Y"

. . . usually followed by "You obviously know nothing about science, you idiot!".


Well, folks, I'd bet my last buck that for ALMOST (he hedged pusillanimously) any such statement, a distinguished scientist (or a thousand) can be found who say precisely the opposite.

Scientists are a heterogenous bunch with all manner of things--not infrequently, mutually contradictory things--to say on the subject of what science is, what its methods and goals are, etc., etc.



Related to your own remarks above, the topic of scientific realism vs. scientific antirealism has come up several times already in this thread. The tension is this:


Those scientists of a more antirealist persuasion, guided by traditional empiricist principles (Locke, Berkeley, Hume, etc.), feel that science should stick as close as possible to what is observable, like, say, water melting. The task of science is simply to systematize as parsimoniously as possible, in the form of laws and inductive generalizations, observable phenomena.

It may be appropriate sometimes, on this view, to posit unobservable entities or processes such as quarks and fields, perhaps, or even multiple universes, but what is inappropriate is the commitment to a BELIEF in the reality of these spooks. They ought to be regarded as "useful fictions" or "façons de parler" or suchlike.

And what are the advantages? Avoidance of (what they see as) metaphysics, avoidance of believing in stuff that quite possibly DOES NOT EXIST.




The scientific realists, on the other hand, insist that science has to do more: science must "go behind the scenes", so to speak, providing causal-explanatory accounts for WHY we see what we see. And if that involves a commitment--a BELIEF--in unobservable creepie-crawlies (Higgs bosons, spacetime, multiple universes, etc.) then so be it!



Now, a great many scientists may not even have HEARD of the terms "scientific realism" and "scientific antirealism". They may even disavow any such allegiance: "Philosophy is for losers. I'm a hardnosed SCIENTIST!".

Their sympathies to one or the other position, though, are inevitably revealed in the comments they make. Whether they know it or not, they are adopting a philosophical stance.


So, in conclusion, does a theory that postulates multiple universes constitute SCIENCE ? And if it does, should we BELIEVE that these universes are real?

Ans: Depends who you ask.


What about water melting? Well, an antirealist will tell you THAT water melts at a certain temperature. If you ask her WHY, though, you may notice sweat appear on her brow.





And yes, it is a little "incongruous", shall we say, that certain scientists are quite willing to entertain the possibility of multiple universes where Richard Dawkins handles rattlesnakes and beautiful women fall madly in love with me at first sight . . . but God? . . . That's ridiculous!




"Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door."


- Richard Lewontin, "Billions and Billions of Demons" (New York Review of Books)

axocanth: Whoops! I almost screwed up.

Mine is a mango smoothie; Vianna's is strawberry.

axocanth: Re Daniel Dennett.

No, I'm not a fan either. Besides his Ultra-Darwinian madness he's also one of these philosophers who denies the existence of consciousness! He's a bit coy about saying it in so many words (after all, people might laugh), but it's there.


One of my fave philosophers, John Searle, says of Dennett and those like him who deny consciousness:

"When you meet people like that at conferences, you just wanna go up and pinch them."

(because, on their own account, they would feel nothing: consciousness is an illusion)


And I suspect when Searle says "pinch" he has something less gentlemanly in mind . . .




Dennett and Searle don't like each other much.

But I'd recommend Searle if you're not familiar with him already -- obscenely clever and very funny too. How good does it get?

(He has three complete lecture series on Youtube if you're interested.)

axocanth: You might enjoy this: Searle on postmodernism (41:00 - 43:00 mins)

axocanth: Oh, and just a comment on this:


"On the other hand, we have put people on the Moon; and we may soon put people – perhaps even pyramids! – on freaking Mars!!! That has to count for something, no?"

- JX




Yes, indeed, science got us to the Moon, based on Newtonian physics in particular.


What's the moral of the story: Science, in some disciplines at least (e.g. physics), produces theories of extraordinary predictive power which, in some cases, leads to practical applications.


I emphasize "some" disciplines, because in certain other scientific disciplines, economics perhaps, one might be as well tossing a coin than trusting the predictions of a theory.


Where we need to be careful, though, is with the kind of dubious inference commonly seen:

"How can you possibly NOT believe scientific theories are true (you idiot!)? Don't you realize that your laptop, your GPS system would not work if these theories weren't true?"



The inference being made here is from "a scientific theory yields accurate predictions" to "that theory is TRUE".

. . . and here there be even more dragons.


2nd moral: That a theory yields accurate predictions is no guarantee of its truth. Infer at your own peril.



Oh, and the very same Newtonian physics that got us to the Moon--and could get us there again--is now considered false.

axocanth: Since the words "true/truth" keep coming up, perhaps a few words might be in order . . .



What does it mean to say a scientific theory is true? What does it mean to say ANY statement is true?

At the VERY least, the central terms of the theory/statement must REFER.



Let's take Richard Dawkins as our guinea pig and see what can be said about him with a simple subject-predicate sentence.


"Richard Dawkins [insert predicate here]."


Now, since the NAME "Richard Dawkins" (a linguistic entity with 14 letters) REFERS to a person, Richard Dawkins (the flesh and blood dude with no letters), we can say both true and false things about him. E.g.

"Richard Dawkins is an atheist" is a true statement.

"Richard Dawkins is much loved by JX Amaro" is a false statement.




Now contrast this with a non-referring name; a name that refers to nothing, or more correctly, a name that FAILS TO REFER. How about Pegasus? (or "honest politician" ). And we shall assume that Pegasus does not exist.

"Pegasus [insert predicate here]"


Try it for yourself. You will not be able to construct a true statement, no matter what predicate you insert. E.g.


"Pegasus has wings" is untrue

"Pegasus doesn't have wings" is also untrue.


Pegasus doesn't exist, remember? "He" has no attributes whatsoever. There is nothing there to predicate wingedness or lack thereof to!


(The only exception I know of is this: "Pegasus does not exist" - a true statement!)




Conclusion: To even STAND A CHANCE of saying something true, the subject term of the statement must REFER.


The same applies to scientific theories. Consider:

"Gravity [insert predicate here]"



We've agreed that to even stand a chance of saying something true, the subject term--e.g. "Richard Dawkins", "gravity"--must refer. But how do we determine whether it DOES refer or not?

The first idea that probably comes to mind is to ask the person making the statement to elaborate; to offer a description which uniquely identifies that person or thing.

After all, no doubt there are lots of people called "Richard Dawkins" out there. We might ask: Who are you talking about?

The person making the statements might reply "You know. The English scientist who wrote 'The Selfish Gene' " . . . and successful reference has been achieved. There is indeed a man out there who uniquely satisfies that description. We may now proceed to say true or false things about him.


What do you mean by "Pegasus"? I mean "A white, winged horse that can fly".

As far as we can tell, nothing out there satisfies this description, therefore the name fails to refer, and nothing true can be said about it.


What about gravity then?

A Newtonian might reply, "You know. It's an attractive force that acts instantaneously over any distance."

And as far as we can tell, nothing out there satisfies this description, therefore the name/term "gravity" fails to refer, and nothing true can be said about it, at least the way a Newtonian uses the term.



Conclusion:

If we adopt the above "descriptive" criterion for determining reference, and if the Newtonian's description is not satisfied by anything in reality (as scientists now claim), then nothing true can be said of Newtonian gravity.

axocanth: So back to incommensurability . . . Rival scientific theories often contain the same terms (e.g. atom, planet, mass, gravity, light, etc.), thus on the surface at least, it appears they are theories about the SAME THINGS, and it might be reasonable to conclude that one theory (of atoms, say) is a continuation of another.

But are they REALLY talking about the same things?

If JX says "Vianna is strikingly beautiful" and I say "Not only that but she's mad about Scotsmen" are we increasing our knowledge about Vianna?

Or are we simply talking past each other? Talking about two DIFFERENT people or things?

Depends on how reference is achieved.

axocanth: Oh, and if anyone out there thinks this is just so much philosophical mumbo-jumbo, ask yourself (if you're an atheist) how you would justify your claim that God doesn't exist.

Would your answer be . . . "Because as far as we can tell, the name "God" fails to refer; nothing in reality satisfies the description 'omnipotent, omniscient being and creator of all things' " ?

Looks like we're all philosophers.

axocanth: One last thing before I shut up . . .

Bringing together recent posts on the social factors that influence science and Harpy's claim that good scientists never deliberately go against the evidence, consider the following:

Newtonian physics was immediately and wholeheartedly embraced in England.

On the continent, meanwhile, resistance was fierce, especially (surprise surprise!) among the French.

Yes, I know it takes some time for ideas to disseminate, particularly back then, but even AFTER Newton's ideas were well known, the French STILL resisted with tooth and claw.

Such a phenomenon, by no means rare in science, does not sit at all well with the kind of simplistic claim that all that matters to a scientist is evidence and logic. Clearly, nationalistic allegiance played a role.

Um, which side was going with the evidence and which against?

Viannaa: lol

axocanth:

harpalycus47: Re JX Amaro
What a totally weird excuse, to go to a book about Dawkins rather than Dawkins' own book for suitable quotes and to be so slapdash as to 'unfortunately' fall upon two which are not by Dawkins (but which give a satisfyingly misleading account of Dawkins' own views). Could it just be that he could not find any actual quotes of Dawkins saying what he wanted him to say? It would be interesting to ask him to find equivalent quotes of Dawkins that support what is called social Darwinism.
Moreover, the first one has initial 'scare quotes' around the phrase 'The laws of nature' and cannot, therefore be regarded as a quote, especially as it follows an introductory 'The reasoning of such a person is as follows:'
The second is similarly introduced by 'The consistent atheist whose beliefs, as he claims, originate in science, presents the following reasoning:'
Neither fall within the presumed quotation marks and therefore clearly demonstrate that they are the words of the reasoning person in the first and the consistent atheist in the second.
Finally, if you realise that you have made a mistake you say so and apologise, you don't deny it and complain that your interlocuter is so stupid as to question a genuine quotation, giving full details as evidence. Unfortunately, this was a reference to the third quotation which was genuine, and as one can read, was accepted as such from the start. There was absolutely nothing said of the two fraudulent ones.
And why was there no mention of this excuse at the time. As it is some time, four months or so, since he was accused of lying and cheating, it is clearly a constructed excuse, or it would have been given immediately.

axocanth: We often hear it said--not necessarily by anyone here--that the only things that matter to (good!) scientists in proposing theories, appraising theories, or making knowledge claims in general, are evidence and logic.

Any such claim presupposes that the generation of scientific "knowledge"--genuine knowledge or that which is mistakenly TAKEN to be knowledge--is somehow "transcendent", blissfully detached from the social and cultural zeitgeist in which it is embedded.




Is the claim plausible? I'd say not. This is not to deny that evidence and logic play some role, but to claim that they play an EXCLUSIVE role seems hopelessly quixotic.

Some examples . . .



Pharmaceuticals-Medicine: Far more money and time is devoted to curing male baldness and erectile dysfunction, say, than is devoted to what might be regarded as more worthy causes, with all due respect to our more flaccid members out there.

This much is surely uncontroversial, and likely to be admitted by scientists themselves.

Far more controversial, and far less likely to be conceded by scientists themselves, is that the (putative) knowledge thereby produced is contaminated by . . . shall we say "extra-scientific" factors.

That is to say, not only is the choice of which programmes are pursued (baldness cures, etc.) affected by social, psychological, cultural, and political factors, but that the RESULTS are too.



Those of you who haven't read Stephen Jay Gould's "The Mismeasure of Man" are in for an eye-opener. During the 19th century in particular, a great deal of scientific research was conducted into the divergent intellectual capacities of various groups.

Needless to say, it was invariably shown--by male Caucasian scientists!--that Caucasian males sit atop the brainiac pecking order. Below these ivory heights lay the Asiatics, the Eskimos, the Hottentots (a big deal at the time), oh, and you women ensconced somewhere among the other riff-raff and untouchables.

And no prizes for guessing which group was inevitably shown to be the dumbest (trivia clue: as far from white as possible).



My purpose here is not to bash 19th century scientists: just about everyone was a racist back then; it was "de rigueur", demanded by fashion! The scientists were simply reflecting the social and cultural biases that were abroad "in the air".

Blessedly, science has largely outgrown its racist and sexist prejudices, or so we'd like to think, just as society at large has. Surely, though, it would be naive to suggest that science is no longer susceptible to the influences of the social milieu in which it is embedded.





Next example: quantum mechanics (QM).

It's not necessary to know the details, though you may have heard of the numerous "interpretations" of QM jostling for attention. What's that all about?

Well, several theories, or "interpretations" if you prefer, have been proposed to accommodate the same body of data, some more popular than others. That is, various ways have been proposed to make sense of precisely the same collection of observable facts.

Therefore, if we assume that all evidence is empirical evidence (i.e., the facts!), then it's hard to explain--appealing only to scientific factors--why certain interpretations enjoy greater popularity than others, given the evidence is EXACTLY THE SAME!


Indeed, one particular interpretation--the so-called "Copenhagen" interpretation--held a virtual stranglehold on the physics community for several decades in the previous century, and to some extent still does. Dissent was not taken to charitably at all! For example:


[John] Clauser recalled that during his student days "open inquiry into the wonders and peculiarities of quantum mechanics" that went beyond the Copenhagen interpretation was "virtually prohibited by the existence of various religious stigmas and social pressures, that taken together, amounted to an evangelical crusade against such thinking."

- "Quantum: Einstein, Bohr, and the great debate about the nature of reality", Manjit Kumar, p356

(John Clauser was the first person to experimentally test Bell's theorem)



It would appear, then, that there's more going on here than just "evidence and logic" affecting the proclivities and predilections of physicists in opting for one theory over another.

How is the hegemony of the Copenhagen interpretation to be explained? I'd suggest, among other reasons, that it was--once again--a reflection of the background cultural zeitgeist. A philosophical movement known as "positivism" held sway, deeply suspicious of "metaphysics", which to them meant anything not directly linked to observation.

This was reflected throughout the sciences of the period as a whole, for example, the dominance of "behaviorism" in psychology with its concomitant distrust of the mind and consciousness . . . finally becoming more scientifically respectable again of late.

Positivism started to decline around the 1960s . . . just as it started to become possible to advocate alternative interpretations of QM without disappearing in the middle of the night and to speak of consciousness without being pilloried.

axocanth: More on the "falsifiability" of scientific theories . . .




Near the top of page 5 in this thread, Harpy says the following:


"The best theory provides the best matches. You don't throw out a theory that is manifestly far better than any other alternative because something doesn't fit. Modifications of the theory, corrections of the data, unknown factors are all possible answers. Until a better theory comes along, which people WILL be working on, you go with the best and assume that some sort of answer will be forthcoming."



What Harpy is telling us here--I think correctly--can be summarized thus:


1. A good theory should have at least a reasonably good fit with the data/facts/evidence. Let's just say "facts" from now on for simplicity.

2. Despite what you might hear sometimes from people less sophisticated than Harpy, it's unlikely that a theory, especially a grand, all-encompassing, explanatory theory of the kind that science prizes most (e.g., general relativity, the theory of evolution, etc.), will fit ALL the facts. Scientific theories typically have to face numerous "anomalies"; facts that do not sit comfortably with the theory.

3. Scientists, by and large, do not declare a good theory to be falsified and throw it in the dustbin just because of a few anomalies. As Harpy rightly states, anomalies can be dealt with in various ways: scientists may choose to tweak the theory, tweak the background assumptions (so-called "auxiliary hypotheses" ), or do nothing at all, assuming that "unknown factors" are in play and hoping some bright spark will come along and straighten things out.




So far so good! Harpy and I are in complete agreement thus far.




Towards the bottom of page 5, however, Harpy tells us of Intelligent Design theory . . .


"Intelligent design is pseudoscience because it does not explain anything. There is no way of falsifying it."


. . . to which I reply . . .


" . . . which puts it in the same boat as any interesting scientific theory."


The conversation continues . . .


"A theory that is unfalsifiable is not a theory. Would you care to give me an example of a theory that is unfalsifiable?" - Harpy


"How about general relativity, say? How could that be falsified?" - me


"By showing that light does not bend in the gravitational field of large objects. Theories can be defended by ad hoc additions, but they will quickly fall into disfavour when compared to a more successful theory." - Harpy





Just a quick sidenote first, more of general interest than of relevance to the present discussion. We often hear it said that Einstein's general relativity predicts that light is bent by massive objects like the Sun, thereby distinguishing it from classical Newtonian physics.

This is incorrect: BOTH theories predict the bending of light. What distinguishes the former from the latter is the prediction of the DEGREE to which light is bent. GR predicts a deflection roughly double that of Newton, in the case of our Sun at least.




Back to the point . . .

Harpy first told us, correctly in my opinion, that scientists don't declare a good theory to be false and throw it away just because of a few anomalies; just because it does not fit certain facts:

"You don't throw out a theory that is manifestly far better than any other alternative because something doesn't fit." - Harpy

Harpy then told us, somewhat incongruously, that a particular anomaly--the fact that light does not bend to the degree GR predicts--WOULD have falsified the theory.





I've never understood the expression, "You can't have your cake and eat it". Er, why not?

In this particular case (or cake), though, it's hard to reconcile Harpy's remark that a few anomalies do not sound the death knell for a good scientific theory with his remark that a particular anomaly WOULD HAVE put the quietus to Einstein's theory.

Essentially, Harpy is asserting both (i) an awkward fact DOES NOT kill a good theory, and (ii) an awkward fact DOES kill a good theory.




Well, dear readers, in case you don't know the background, Einstein's general theory of relativity was announced to the world in its completed form in 1915. Among many other predictions of his wonderful theory, one is that the path of light is bent (to a certain degree) by massive objects such as our Sun.

This was first put to the test four years later in 1919 with a celebrated expedition (actually two: to Africa and South America) organized by Arthur Eddington to study a solar eclipse. The results were actually far less conclusive than we're often led to believe, but we can ignore that for now. The expedition was announced as a resounding success and an important confirmation of Einstein's theory.





But what if the results had come back negative? How do you think Einstein and other GR supporters would have reacted? And, needless to say, the way ONE scientist reacts to a particular result may not the way ALL scientists react. As I keep emphasizing, scientists are a heterogeneous bunch.

We get a clue from the following anecdote. I cannot personally vouch for its authenticity, though it strikes me as fairly typical of the way scientists committed to a favorite theory often react to a negative result.



"A student who was working for Einstein in 1919 gave the following account: "Once when I was with Einstein in order to read with him a work that contained many objections against his theory... he suddenly interrupted the discussion of the book, reached for a telegram that was lying on the windowsill, and handed it to me with the words, 'Here, this will perhaps interest you.' It was Eddington's cable with the results of measurement of the eclipse expedition [1919]. When I was giving expression to my joy that the results coincided with his calculations, he said quite unmoved, 'But I knew that the theory was correct', and when I asked, what if there had been no confirmation of his prediction, he countered, 'Then I would have been sorry for the dear Lord -- the theory is correct.' "

-- quoted in "Philosophical Concepts in Physics", James T. Cushing




Gotta love a man with confidence, eh?

axocanth: Just one more point to note on the above.



Let's suppose there are two groups of people, Group A and Group B. Both have their respective theories.

In the face of awkward facts, members of Group A invariably cling like limpets to the theory.

In the face of awkward facts, members of Group B invariably renounce the theory, declare it to be false, and toss it on the scrapheap -- next to Justin Bieber's Greatest Hits.



What we see, then, is a difference in BEHAVIOR between the two groups. Some people might be inclined to say that Group B is behaving in a more "scientific" manner.

I'm saying nothing.



The point to be made, though, is that we have learned nothing about the falsifiability of the respective theories THEMSELVES.

To renounce a theory and declare it to be false (i.e., BELIEVED to be false) is quite another matter from a theory having been SHOWN or PROVEN to be false.



Indeed, the kind of behavior exhibited by Group B is what philosopher Karl Popper describes as "METHODOLOGICAL falsification": Proponents of a theory must specify in advance a condition under which they would renounce their theory. If such a condition is shown to obtain, they keep their word and give the theory an ignominious boot.



I am aware of no actual group of people who, as a whole, behave in such a manner.




"Methodological falsification" is to be distinguished from what I'll call "naive falsification" under which contrary facts PROVE a theory to be false.

Neither Intelligent Design theory nor any interesting scientific theory is amenable to naive falsification. Neither theory can be SHOWN to be false.

As Harpy admits himself, there are ALWAYS ways--better or worse--to keep a theory alive.

axocanth: So, do scientists REALLY behave in a manner like Group B, invariably renouncing their theories in the fact of awkward facts?

Ans: Nothing like it!


Have you read Thomas Kuhn's "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" yet?

JX Amaro:
Re: Kuhn and His Critics

Axo: “Have you read Thomas Kuhn's "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" yet?”

JX: I think this question was directed at Harpy, or maybe at the readership in general. Either way, a little bit of – Heaven sent! – free time allows me to indulge a few thoughts. Needless to say, many people have and don’t like it! Here’s a quote from the Customer Reviews section on Amazon.

“Kuhn was a confused philosopher/historian when he wrote the first edition of Structure, and he remained confused until the end, heaping absurdity upon absurdity as he revised everything” – retired professor (1-star review)

The bitterness and hostility of this and related critics is really amazing. Also, their criticism often seems vacuous and off-point, expressing a tone of bitterness and scorn rather than objective critique: cool-headed exposure of flawed thinking.

It seems to me that if one wants to criticize Kuhn, the best card to play is the TOTALLY OBVIOUS one!

“Say what?”
Say this: Can’t one simply argue – or observe – that Kuhn’s “Structure” theory is itself a Paradigm? Essentially, it works like this. A Theory is established as Orthodoxy and the stuff of “reputable scientists.” Normal Science follows. Anomalies not explained by the Theory appear and are swept under the rug. Over time, enough Anomalies appear that a revolutionary New Theory develops. After a violent ruckus, the New Theory overthrows the Old Theory via a palace coup. In this way, the New Theory becomes the reigning Paradigm and Normal Science follows. Repeat. Repeat. Repeat.

Essentially, the counter-theory to Kuhn is the notion that science is gradually climbing the “Stairway to Truth.” Piece by piece, generation by generation, knowledge grows and Humanity gets a better understanding of the Universe. Yay! Cue “Here Comes the Sun” by the Beatles!

With this in mind, the Critic could play Kuhn’s Incommensurability Card against Kuhn saying there is no reason to think the “Structure” Paradigm is any more true than the “Stairway to Knowledge” Paradigm. They are both Paradigms and there is no way to establish which is Forever King and which is Suicide Pawn.

Wouldn’t Kuhn have to scratch his head and say: “Gosh, you’re right!” ???

Note: I also found this comment by reviewer David Butler an interesting take-away: “Kuhn's writings, are as Captain Barbossa in Pirates of the Caribbean said so well, just guidelines.”

Further Note: For those hard up for cash, you can listen to Kuhn’s “Structure…” for free on YouTube:
YouTube

axocanth: @ JX


"I think this question ("Have you read "Structure?" ) was directed at Harpy, or maybe at the readership in general."

It was directed at the readership in general . . . assuming there are any.





"The bitterness and hostility of this and related critics is really amazing."


The bitterness and hostility stopped amazing this old dog a long time ago. I sometimes wonder if one might be safer shouting insults about Muhammud in the middle of Mecca than to question scientistic dogma, especially with respect to the topic of evolution.

(The term "scientism", as I'm using it anyway, refers to the overzealous, religious-like, veneration of science.)

Earlier in this thread I offered a few critiques of a Youtuber--evidently an evolutionary biologist himself--which I posted on his page. You should see the replies!

In places such as this, at least to begin with, I'm almost invariably marked as an enemy of science, a Creationist, or both (I'm neither). This is no doubt a result of certain skeptical remarks I make regarding the believability of scientific knowledge claims, and myths about science in general.

Justifying these claims with evidence and argumentation tends to have little or no effect on the thick thousands. You're not supposed to say "bad" things about science and that's that! Only a precious few are endowed with the sophistication to view matters more objectively . . . bless 'em all !



I often wonder what these people, er sheeple, want from people like myself -- to believe EVERYTHING scientists tell us?

Hold that thought! Here's Neil deGrasse Tyson . . .





Tyson's comment in the video above must rank as one of the most monumentally stupid remarks I have ever heard in my life! True to form, though, the audience applauds thunderously, not unlike a crowd under the hypnotic spell of a televangelist, as I consider signing up for the French foreign legion.


What exactly are you telling us, professor? EVERY claim that science makes is true and ought to be believed? That would surely be as preposterous as believing NOTHING that scientists say -- a position I am often mistakenly held to advocate.


If a reason is even needed to state the obvious, here are two:

1. Scientists routinely do not even agree among THEMSELVES which claims are worthy of belief.

2. Science's track record of getting things WRONG speaks for itself.




"For in formulating the question as to how to explain why the methods of science lead to instrumental success, the realist has seriously misstated the explanandum. Overwhelmingly, the results of the conscientious pursuit of scientific enquiry are failures: failed theories, failed hypotheses, failed conjectures, inaccurate measurements, inaccurate estimations of parameters, fallacious causal inferences, and so forth. If explanations are appropriate here, then what requires explaining is why the very same methods produce an overwhelming background of failures and, occasionally, also a pattern of successes. The realist literature has not yet begun to address this question, much less to offer even a hint of how to answer it."

- Arthur Fine (philosopher of science)




Or if you'd rather hear a leading scientist say the same thing . . .


"The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the world. Their brief period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned one after the other; he sees ruins piled upon ruins; he predicts that the theories in fashion today will in a short time succumb in their turn, and he concludes that they are absolutely in vain. This is what he calls the bankruptcy of science."

- Henri Poincare

axocanth: "It seems to me that if one wants to criticize Kuhn, the best card to play is the TOTALLY OBVIOUS one!"

- JX




It's an interesting point you raise. Give him the old "Tu quoque!".

I suppose one response might be that since Kuhn is doing a combination of history and philosophy, his critique of science does not apply to himself. Indeed, it's not obvious that there is such a thing as "normal philosophy". What do you think?

Clearly, though, this response won't work for the sociologists of science mentioned earlier . . . and they're aware of it. If they're gonna argue that scientific knowledge claims are, at least to some extent, socially constructed, then--sociology being a science itself--the critique must also apply to sociology.

These guys recognize and concede this.

axocanth: A quick summary of Thomas Kuhn's ideas (captured very nicely by JX above) for the uninitiated. It's essentially a "stage" theory of science:



* Prescientific stage: Various camps disagreeing with one another



* Normal science (a technical term): the typical state of science.


A "paradigm" gains universal, or almost universal, acceptance (e.g. the theory of evolution itself and all its accoutrements). The paradigm virtually defines what science is; anyone denying the paradigm is liable to be charged with engaging in pseudoscience, not doing science at all.

Despite what we often hear, scientists are not constantly "testing", or attempting to falsify the paradigm. E.g. "The theory of evolution has been tested countless times and has passed every test with flying colors". Nonsense, says Kuhn. The paradigm is taken for granted, assumed to be true.

All major theories are riddled with "anomalies" -- facts that don't fit the theory snugly. These anomalies are not regarded as refutations. One of the main tasks of normal science is "puzzle solving" -- to assimilate these anomalies into the paradigm, to FORCE awkward evidence into the box provided by the paradigm.

For example, the existence of altruism does not sit well with the theory of evolution and its supposed struggle of all against all. This is not seen as a refutation or falsification, though. Normal scientists attempt to make the anomaly consistent with the paradigm. Failure to do so is regarded as a failure of the SCIENTIST and not the theory.


Many anomalies are thus assimilated successfully. A few, however, are not, despite repeated attempts. This may generate a certain feeling of unease, though a major theory is never abandoned in the absence of an alternative.




* Revolutionary science

All hell breaks loose! Two rival paradigms jostle for attention. Some scientists, especially younger ones, embrace the new paradigm with alacrity. Other scientists continue to defend the old one until they're all six feet under.

The process of switching allegiance from one paradigm to another is not unlike a religious conversion; it is not a (wholly) rational process.

Rival paradigms are to some extent "incommensurable" -- proponents of each are linguistically at odds with one another. Certain core terms, common to both paradigms, do not MEAN the same under the respective paradigms (e.g. "mass" does not mean to Einstein what it meant to Newton).

Finally the new paradigm gains ascendancy, science/history books are rewritten making it appear that acceptance of the new paradigm was a rational, logical progression. We may be told, for example, that the old paradigm was "falsified", perhaps by a "crucial experiment" (e.g. the Michelson-Morley experiment disproved the aether).


The myth of science as the gradual, steady accumulation of knowledge is exposed.



And the cycle continues . . .

axocanth: Consider, for example, the following video, especially the first minute:

YouTube



Dawkins tells us: "There has got to be a series of advantages all the way, in the feather. If you can't think of one, then that's your problem, not natural selection's problem. Natural selection, er, um, well, I suppose that is a matter of faith on my part..."





Now, what's being said here? Dawkins describes a--possibly hypothetical--scenario where there is a mismatch between theory and facts, viz., the theory of evolution makes a prediction (about the evolution of the feather) while no one can explain this.


(Before someone screams that science CAN explain the feather, it doesn't matter whether such a situation actually obtains; it's a conceptual point.).


In Kuhn's terminology, then, the inexplicability of feather evolution constitutes an anomaly.


Now, on a common understanding of science, when facts are at odds with theory, the theory has been falsified and must be abandoned.

What Dawkins is saying, though, is clearly incompatible with this view. Dawkins is saying that a failure to reconcile anomalous facts with theory is a failure of the SCIENTIST ("That's your problem" ), not a failure of the THEORY.

Compare with what I said in the post above:

"Normal scientists attempt to make the anomaly consistent with the paradigm. Failure to do so is regarded as a failure of the SCIENTIST and not the theory."





A common view of science holds that scientists are constantly testing their theories, ever skeptical, trying to show that they are false.

Dawkins, meanwhile, tells us that natural selection theory is a "matter of faith" on his part. Compare once again with my previous post:

"Despite what we often hear, scientists are not constantly "testing", or attempting to falsify the paradigm. E.g. "The theory of evolution has been tested countless times and has passed every test with flying colors". Nonsense, says Kuhn. The paradigm is taken for granted, assumed to be true."




Chalk one up for Kuhn!

axocanth: As for the suggestion that scientists go to where the evidence points, for your consideration . . .


"But almost equally powerful was the conviction that knowledge is about abstractions, and that it can go beyond and even against the evidence of our senses. Thus Galileo praised Copernicus for holding firm to his conviction that the planets (including the Earth) go around the sun, even when the evidence of the senses directly contradicted his theories"

-- David Wootton, "Galileo: Watcher of the Skies", p253



Perhaps one feature that distinguishes the very finest scientists (Einstein, Galileo, etc.) from the less gifted is precisely the fact that they dare to take the road less traveled by, to boldly go where the meek, with the empirical evidence on their side, fear to tread . . . with evidentiary vindication--if it comes at all--coming later.

axocanth: And for anyone who still believes scientific theories can be falsified in any definitive or absolute sense . . .



"I think it was this demand which was approached, but not quite accurately, by Sir Karl Popper's famous demarcation criterion, according to which to behave scientifically is to be open to falsification. The trouble with this, as Lakatos showed [in "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes"], was that the most respectable, paradigm scientists often hold theories in ways which the criterion would condemn. An adherent of Newton in the nineteenth century might have been quite unable to conceive of circumstances which would lead him to declare the general principles of mechanics false; any disturbing results would be deemed to be mere anomalies, and met with relatively ad hoc adjustments to the overall theory. And why should we demand higher standards from psychoanalysts or social theorists than from physicists?"

-- Simon Blackburn, "Spreading the Word", p255-256




"Pierre Duhem and W. Van Orman Quine pointed out long ago that a scientific theory can never be absolutely ruled out by experimental data because there is always some way of manipulating the theory or the auxiliary assumptions to create an agreement between theory and experiment."

-- Steven Weinberg (Nobel Prize laureate in physics), "Dreams of a Final Theory", p125




The reason why scientific theories cannot be falsified is alluded to by Weinberg above: the so-called "Duhem-Quine thesis", after French physicist Pierre Duhem and American philosopher W. V. O. Quine.

Google and ye shall find.

Or buy me a 6-pack and I'll explain it.

JX Amaro:
Re: Acid Science, Stoned Scientists and Why It Matters

Axo posted this 18 second video. It’s worth watching again.
YouTube

Yes, Science is “True” whether you like it or not, Sub-Inquisitor Tyson tells us. This is the same Tyson who tells us the Multiverse is true, and therefore, presumably, there really is a planet where Sam Harris is the Sexiest Man Alive and good old Neil DeGrasse Tyson is married to Marilyn Monroe while conducting a hot and steamy affair with Jayne Mansfield. Yes, no doubt. Hey, it’s Science! It doesn’t matter if you believe it or not, peasant! Shut up and obey! Follow the damn Science, you ignorant rube!

Ahh, if only this was a joke of pompous Scientists making bloated fools of themselves on the Bill Mahr Show. But it’s not. This is where the “The S##t gets Real.” You see, kind reader, it’s not just love-ins with fabulous beauties that scientific stoners like Tyson are dreaming about. (I’ll bet any money that he dreams of Jeri Ryan’s “Seven-of-Nine” from Star Trek Voyager. In fairness, she was HOT!!!!) No, they also daydream about war – thermonuclear and otherwise.

Watch this:
YouTube

“Modern nukes don’t have a radiation problem. Just to be clear.” – Tyson
“There’s a reaction to nukes that’s out of proportion to what they really do.” – Tyson

It’s nice to see that Tyson is really earning his paycheck in attempting to quell opposition to taking the Ukraine War nuclear. Radiation really isn’t a problem, he tells us. Later he explains, amid laughter and giggles, that radiation IS a problem IF fission bombs are used. Apparently, no problem, though. WTF?!?!?!?

Koo-koo. Koo-koo. Koo-koo.

Note: In the comments section, Tyson gets ripped apart for not knowing what the hell he is talking about vis-a-vis thermonuclear weapons. Surprise, surprise…

Note: This from Cory Ettinger in the comments section I also found quite on-point: “He couldn't be more wrong, yet so positive in his wrongness. The man is just a shill for the machine.”

#################

Re: Grand Inquisitor Dawkins, Evolution and Paradigm Fall

As long as we are talking about Kuhn, Paradigms, Normal Science and Revolutionary Science, it might be interesting to take a look into that hot-button topic of Evolution – source of so much debate on Wire.

While we all know about the excited War against Evolution coming from the Creationist community, what about the Evolution community itself? Is Evolution really “A Theory” or are we dealing a collection of competing theories? And if the later, does that not compromise and shouldn’t it “quantitatively ease” the confidence that so many express that “Evolution is a Fact”? (Can there be two, three or more versions of a “fact”?)

Let us consider Jerry Coyne’s book “Why Evolution is True.” Surely this has the “imprimatur” of the Evolution crowd. He-Who-Must-Not-Be-Slandered Richard Dawkins calls it: “Outstandingly good… Coyne’s knowledge of evolutionary biology is prodigious, his employment of it masterful.” High praise. But there’s more. The New York Times excitedly tells us: “(Coyne) makes an unassailable case.” Get that: Unassailable!!!

Wow, I’m impressed. Game over.
Or is it???

In June of 2022 (this year!) the Guardian Magazine (NOT a creationist blog) published an article entitled, “Do We Need a New Theory of Evolution.” Feel free to read it:
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2022/jun/28/do-we-need-a-new-theory-of-evolution
Key Line: “This is the basic story of evolution, as recounted in countless textbooks and pop-science bestsellers. The problem, according to a growing number of scientists, is that it is absurdly crude and misleading.”

Wow! And I thought the mainstream version – as per Coyne – was, according to the NYT, “unassailable.” ShOcKeR!!!

Is it possible that the mainstream Theory of Evolutionary is having problems? Is it possible that “Anomalies” are popping up, too many to sweep under the rug? Is it possible that we are seeing the rise of Revolutionary Science, not just outside the Evolution camp but inside the camp as well??? Is it possible that we are seeing Kuhn’s “Structure…” ideas playing out in real time, right in front of our faces? Are we on the edge of an academic palace coup, a “Paradigm Fall”???

If so, Coyne’s book is just a laughable swan song of a dogmatic Theory of Evolution that is soon to join Marxist-Leninist-Stalinism in the dumpster of history. If so, people like Coyne and Dawkins will go down as crusty authoritarians – a la Brezhnev – standing in the way of scientific progress (assuming such a thing exists).

Sad, sad, sad…

For those of you who have put people like Dawkins and Coyne on a pedestal, you might want to console yourself to this, quite apropos, song by Suzanne Vega: “When Heroes Go Down.”
YouTube

Great Lyric: “When heroes go down, they go down fast / So don’t expect any time, to equivocate the past.”
Nice!!!

Is another victory for Kuhn coming?

axocanth: JX

"Ahh, if only this was a joke of pompous Scientists making bloated fools of themselves on the Bill Mahr Show. But it’s not."



My own vote for the high profile scientist who says the stupidest--not to mention FALSE!--things goes to Lawrence Krauss, though Richard Dawkins puts up stiff competition.


It's relatively easy to persuade people that when a scientist waxes lyrically on politics, say, he has departed his own area of expertise and ought to be regarded with caution -- there's a good chance he's talking a lot of crap!

Far more difficult is to persuade people that when (some) scientists wax lyrically on SCIENCE the same thing is happening -- they are talking a lot of crap!



What do I mean by this? When Lawrence Krauss, for example, is speaking on the nuts and bolts of some physical theory, he remains within his métier. His views may be challengeable, nonetheless his expertise is acknowledged.

When he steps back from this, however, as scientists often do, and starts rabbiting on about science as a whole (what is science, what are its methods, questions about evidence, confirmation, demarcation, explanation, etc., etc.), whether he knows it or not, and whether the audience knows it or not, he has entered the domain of philosophy of science.

And the inevitable result is that he talks a lot of crap.



Any doubters are invited to post Krauss talking on science (video, articles, etc.) and we'll take a look.


I hasten to add, finally, the above remarks do not apply to many other scientists, familiar with the history and philosophy of science, and who DO speak intelligently on these topics.

Richard Dawkins, Neil deGrasse Tyson, and Lawrence Krauss are not among them.