The Three E's : Evidence, Evolution, and, um, Eggs (Page 5) Corwin: @ the "female" troll. Um, the spelling "complement" or "compliment" are both acceptable as far as I know. But go ahead and hurl your feeble attacks at me... I guess that's what should be expected from a self-proclaimed troll. --------------- @ sprocket girl -- I am in agreement with Colin here that it is a pleasure to read your posts... you are wise beyond your years, and that is refreshing... there are many here in the forums of greater age than you who speak as if they were no more than children. And I also agree that age is no yardstick to measure knowledge or understanding... I merely meant that those with the ability to absorb knowledge will of course absorb an increasing amount of knowledge with age... and those of whom do not have this ability will of course simply become older. I'd like to elaborate more and continue this discussion, but it is time for bed. Kudos, and good-night. (to you too, Mr. Snickering Hound ) orkanen: My hypothesis, concerning how the work of scientists is done, is as follows. One biology scientist, let's call him Andrew, has an idea while pondering over whether milk or sugar goes into the tea cup first. His idea is a breakthrough on a problem he's been working for for months. He jots it down, shows it to his friends and fellow scientists, Alfred, Arthur and Alan, who laugh and scoff at him, deciding to prove him wrong. If either Alfred, Arthur, or Alan, or anyone else for that matter, finds flaws in Andrew's idea, or named more correctly, hypothesis, it is falsified. Andrew should try and falsify his own idea, but his efforts will most likely be half hearted at best, so relying on his jealous friends and others to do the job for him, is necessary. It's not perfect, but so far, it's all we have. I can be, and is, misused either way. Tobacco companies misused it in hopes they managed to increase profits and not have to pay damages, some climate deniers have similar agendas. Not every problem has simple answers. Here's one not so simple problem. The present levels of scientific understanding require years of schooling to fathom. I do understand why some people succumb to religion, or even philosophy, to compensate. Present scientific theories are being constantly tested, Theory of Evolution, included. Whether or not by skilled scientists, is another matter. That said. If you manage to show any major scientific theory wrong, fortune and fame, as well as a Nobel prize, awaits you. CoIin: Hi Orkanen Glad to hear your thoughts. But with regards your final remark... "That said. If you manage to show any major scientific theory wrong, fortune and fame, as well as a Nobel prize, awaits you." ... this is precisely the kind of misconception that I'm hoping this thread can correct. Science just doesn't work that way, I'm afraid. I invite you to review the Nobel Prize archives, but I'm fairly sure you won't find any prizes awarded for falsifications/refutations. And the point I'm trying to make here is that this is not due to any reluctance on the part of the Nobel Committee, but rather THERE IS NO SUCH THING as a definitive falsification at the highest conceptual level in science. For more on the same, see this thread (pages 46 - 50) Topic: Science Kuhn's notion of paradigm shifts that I've been sketching in this thread attempts to describe the process of top level scientific development. Also, re your "Present scientific theories are being constantly tested" remark, once again I'd invite you to read through the thread again. This is exactly what I'm saying does NOT happen. See in particular my third post on page 4. Have you even read the thread, Orkie? orkanen: What? Are you making the exact same mistakes Zanjan made towards your post? I wrote as follows: "Present scientific theories are being constantly tested, Theory of Evolution, included. Whether or not by skilled scientists, is another matter." Second sentence should perhaps have been added to the first, separated only by a comma, but by reading it, you should still see it in connection with the former. Thus, they are being constantly tested, well or not. I tried simplifying, as well as abbreviating my post. Perhaps my efforts went a bit too far? In regards to Theory of Evolution, it has become so large, one person cannot in his life time, read through everything pertained to it. As such, if not a slam dunk, it's too big to be budged easily. You'll have to come up with something extraordinarily wise to rock its foundations. That said, minor details have been located and altered since its conception. Yet the whole picture stands on fairly solid ground. Yes, I did read the whole thread. I may have fallen asleep a couple of times, but I eventually got through it. sprocket girl: Colin, thank you and very well explained! i was thinking along these lines to illustrate your point as a Brit i would say 32 squads perticipated in The Wolrd Cup. silly and meaningless but we tend to say squads not teams.. and certainly our lads were not very comepetetive, thus did the compete?.. haha i know thats the point. if we use different language based on different perspective we could make different statements and both be both wrong and right!! thanks for such an illustrated post! made me think a lot. Corvin, thank you as well! i do understand you and took no offence. truth be told i could tell you respected my post in that you took the time to respond. also, i would be foolish to think that my generation does much to prove youth and wisdom are a common mixture. plus in short you offered sound advice. the rubber analogy was way cool and something i will take with me. plus i love quotes and had not heard the Sagan one. it is valid, wouldnt want my brains be gawked at if they spilled to the ground. thanks to you both and everyone for encouraging me to grow and learn. especially in a subject that is years beyond my schooling and studies! much love and gratitude! CoIin: The notion of "incommensurabilty" between theories which I adverted to on the previous page, and ubiquitous in the writings of Kuhn and Feyerabend, is often rendered by would-be interpreters as "incomparability". Kuhn is anxious to correct what he considers to be a misleading parallel:- "The opposing view, that scientific theories are incomparable, has repeatedly been attributed to me, and [Richard] Boyd himself may believe I hold it. But the book on which this interpretation is imposed [i.e., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions] includes many explicit examples of comparisons between successive theories. I have never doubted either that that they were possible or that they were essential at times of theory choice. Instead, I have tried to make two rather different points. First, comparisons of successive theories with each other and with the world are never sufficient to dictate theory choice. During the period when actual choices are made, two people fully committed to the values and methods of science, and sharing also what both concede to be data, may nevertheless legitimately differ in their choice of theory. Second, successive theories are incommensurable (which is not the same as incomparable) in the sense that the referents of some of the terms which occur in both are a function of the theory within which these terms appear. There is no neutral language into which both of the theories as well as the relevant data may be translated for the purposes of comparison." There are two salient points to note here : (1) Evidence never determines theory choice. Two or more scientists confronted with exactly the same data or evidence may -- while acting perfectly rationally -- pledge allegiance to rival theories. For those of you who believe in The Scientific Method... well, even supposing such a thing exists, it's apparently quite impotent at times like these. Much as they'd love to, scientists do not possess an algorithm to guide theory selection. (2) Kuhn's ideas are often portrayed -- mainly by the detractors of science -- as implying scientific irrationality, an allegation to which he himself explicitly gives short shrift. Incommensurabilty, on Kuhn's account, needn't entail "mob psychology" as some have described it, but it DOES run contrary to the traditional picture of cumulative growth in science. Given that successive theories may not share the same terms, or DO share terms which do not refer to the same entities, there can be no simple 'reduction' of one theory to another. (Consider my example of the Copernican revolution from the previous page.) Well, if cumulative growth is out, does that mean science doesn't make progress? Kuhn's answer is that science DOES progress, but only in the sense of growing ever more instrumentally efficacious; scientists can DO more than before; they're better at solving puzzles than before, much as engineers build better bridges than before. This gives us no reason at all, however, to suppose that science is converging upon Truth. Kuhn is fond of the analogy with Darwinian evolution. Properly understood, evolution is not a "teleological" process, which is to say, it does not advance toward any particular goal or end. The inexorable advance of evolution is PUSHED from behind, not PULLED from ahead. Science is no different. Kuhn continues:- "Conceived as a set of instruments for solving technical puzzles in selected areas, science clearly gains in precision and scope with the passage of time. As an instrument, science undoubtedly does progress. But Boyd's claims are not about the instrumental effectiveness of science but rather about its ontology, about what really exists in nature, about the world's real joints. And in this area I see no historical evidence for a process of zeroing in. As I have suggested elsewhere, the ontology of relativistic physics is, in significant respects, more like that of Aristotelian than that of Newtonian physics. That example must here stand for many." (excerpts from "Metaphor in Science" ) (Edited by CoIin) CoIin: I noted in a previous post that a sharp distinction between facts and theories is untenable. We now recognize that the so-called "facts" are, at least to some degree, theory-laden. They are not GIVEN to us by the world as pristine, untainted pieces of unambiguous data. In any particular context, the inventory of facts is at least partially determined by the theoretical systems, taxonomies, and conceptual schemes brought to bear upon them. Science is largely a problem-solving activity, and I'd now add to the previous observation that much the same can be said for "problems". What constitutes a problem in any given intellectual milieu is, likewise, partly a product of our theoretical commitments. Much ink has been spilled by theologians of the three great Western monotheistic religions over the "problem of evil" - why is there so much nastiness in the world? For those of us, religious or not, who do not subscribe to an omnipotent and omnibenevolent deity, there IS no problem of evil. Evolutionists, meanwhile, beginning with Darwin himself, have been greatly troubled by the "problem of altruism" - why is there so much niceness in the world? Analogously to the problem of evil, there is, of course, nothing intrinsically problematic about altruism. A problem only emerges when the world is regarded with a particular worldview already in mind. (Edited by CoIin) CoIin: I began this thread by noting that when scientists make claims about how the world works, we'd all do well to pay close attention. On the other hand, when scientists, and by extension science fans, advance claims about science ITSELF -- i.e., what is science and how does it proceed, what is the scientific method, what are laws and theories and how are they confirmed or disconfirmed, and so on and so forth -- they cease to do science, encroach upon philosophical territory, and are no longer necessarily the most knowledgeable authority on the matters at hand. Caution is advised. A prime example can be seen in the video I'll post below. In the opening minutes of the video, physics legend Richard Feynman shares his conception of the scientific method. There are three salient points to note here:- 1. Feynman's version of the scientific method is unmistakably Popper, Popper, POPPER! 2. The scientific process on Feynman's account (and that means Popper's account) begins with a "guess". No, it's not a joke. Feynman is echoing a traditional distinction in the philosophy of science, endorsed by Popper and others, between the so-called "context of discovery" and the "context of justification". The former refers to how scientists come by their hypotheses/theories/laws, whereas the latter refers to how these are justified, that is, tested, appraised, and confirmed. On this view, the context of discovery is regarded as entirely non-rational and non-methodical. A hypothesis can come from any person in any way imaginable -- it might appear to the scientist in a dream, it might be a eureka moment, it might be what some call intuition. It matters not. The rationality and method of science, so the story goes, lies not in the context of discovery, but in the context of justification. Guess all you like. The subsequent process of justification will sort the good from the bad. 3. My main point for today. Feynman now asserts that we should proceed to test the consequences of the hypothesis against experience, and... "If it disagrees with experiment, it's wrong. In that simple statement is the key to science. It doesn't make a difference how beautiful your guess is, it doesn't make a difference how smart you are, who made the guess, or what his name is. If it disagrees with experiment, it's wrong. That's all there is to it." This is another of these oft-repeated maxims I've seen circulated by Wireclub science aficionados and affirmed as if it carried divine sanction, precisely the kind of misconception I'm hoping this thread will help to eradicate. Well, with all due respect to Dr. Feynman, things are NOT that simple. That's NOT all there is to it, I'm afraid, as both logical analysis and an examination of the history of science leave no doubt. Your lecturer explains... (Edited by CoIin) (Post deleted by CoIin ) (Post deleted by CoIin ) (Post deleted by CoIin ) (Post deleted by CoIin ) (Post deleted by CoIin ) CoIin: Was Aristotle a scientist? What about Ptolemy? Well, these things depend on definitions, of course. In any case, the term scientist was not coined until the 19th century, prior to which those people who conducted systematic investigations of nature were known as "natural philosophers". I'm not particularly bothered how you decide to characterize them. The point I would like to make, though, is that whatever definition we admit, we must try to be consistent. We can't have Aristotle being a scientist when it tickles your fancy, and not when it interferes with the particular agenda you happen to be pushing at the time. On one account, since the time of the ancient Greeks, or even before, there were thinkers who rejected supernatural causation and sought naturalistic explanations for natural phenomena. We might include names such as Thales and other pre-Socratics, Aristotle, Archimedes, Hippocrates, Galen, and so forth. These men -- at least when it's not inconvenient -- are held up as paradigmatic scientific thinkers; scientists or proto-scientists; men of reason! On another account, however, particularly when the science fan is in a state of high dudgeon, we're told that the Copernican revolution constitutes one of science's great victories; a triumph of systematic rational inquiry into nature over superstition, dogma and ignorance. "The Earth revolves around the Sun and it's a fact and we have science to thank for it. So stick that in your pipe and smoke it! " Well, perhaps so. But whose ideas exactly were being overthrown? Are we to take it now that Aristotle and Ptolemy were the archetypes of superstition, dogma, and ignorance? Were Aristotle and Ptolemy scientists or not? Answer the question. And you can expect me to hold you to it. (Edited by CoIin) CoIin: On page 3 (my first long post on that page), I advanced the opinion that, contrary to the received wisdom that immersion in science conduces to critical thinking, judging from my own experience here in Wireclub, quite the reverse often seems to obtain: a dysfunctional passion for science leads to PARALYSIS rather than enhancement of one's critical faculties - precisely as it does in religion! In that post I gave four examples of patently absurd claims I've seen forwarded by the overzealous, but not necessarily unintelligent, Wireclub science fan, claims which are no less preposterous and no less OBVIOUSLY FALSE than those advanced by his non-secular counterpart, the religious wacko. As of yesterday, a fifth has been added to the list. I quote verbatim this time:- "It's pretty sad that some people don't need scientific peer review to tell them whether or not what they see is real or a figment of their own imaginations." I honestly had difficulty believing my eyes, if you'll pardon the jest . So now we need scientific peer review to confirm the reality of our own sensory data? One can only marvel, yet again, at the forces operant in bringing about belief in this species of manifest absurdity. Science is an empirical discipline; the unofficial philosophical doctrine of modern science JUST IS empiricism. Empiricism, as opposed to rationalism, holds that all knowledge comes to us ultimately through experience, i.e., through our senses. Its most extreme version rejects ANY non-experientially derived knowledge - intuition, divine revelation, Chomskian innate language modules, you name it! Modern science takes for granted that our senses are, more or less, reliable. It is a precondition for there to BE science as we know it. Er, no, I'd suggest we don't need peer review to trust our eyes. I'd further humbly suggest that the purpose of peer review in science is not to reduce or eliminate the possibility that the scientist submitting the report in question was hallucinating. You might make a friend in Plato though. (Edited by CoIin) CoIin: "The supreme task of the physicist is the discovery of the most general elementary laws from which the world-picture can be deduced logically. But there is no logical way to the discovery of these elemental laws. There is only the way of intuition, which is helped by a feeling for the order lying behind the appearance, and this Einfühlung [literally, empathy or 'feeling one's way in'] is developed by experience." - Albert Einstein, Preface to Max Planck's Where is Science Going? (1933) How can you tell when a passion, whether it be for religion or science, has transcended rationality and become dysfunctional? Well, here's one sign : You'll find yourself denying or reconstructing evidence which appears quite unproblematic to everyone else. Let's say, for example, an ancient manuscript is uncovered -- a hitherto unknown gospel, perhaps, or the legendary "Q" source from which both Matthew and Luke supposedly drew -- and we find Jesus saying something very unChristlike. Oh, how about.... "Verily I tell you, I am a man and nothing more than a man. There are those who call me divine. Pay them no mind. They lie." Historians declare the document authentic. No prizes for guessing how the relevant religious nuts would respond to the revelation. It's a no brainer. "Jesus would never say something like that!!" "Ah yes, you see, when Jesus says he is not divine, what he REALLY means is that he IS divine." But science is the very antithesis of this kind of tendentious irrationality. Evidence is paramount! A good scientist accepts the empirical evidence regardless of any preconceived notions he may happen to entertain. Doesn't he? Ahem! Feast your eyes on this then:- (bottom half of page 73 - page 75) Topic: Science So, when the science nut is confronted with an Einstein quote (or quotes) that doesn't happen to dovetail snugly with his own preconceived image of the man, and science in general, does he:- 1. Wonder why Einstein would say something like that 2. Deny the evidence It's another no brainer, I'm afraid. "Einstein would never say something like that!!" "Ah yes, you see, when Einstein says the process of scientific discovery is not rational, what he REALLY means is that it IS rational." (Edited by CoIin) CoIin: . Philosophers ask questions about issues that scientists tend to take for granted, questions that perhaps have not even occurred to scientists, or even questions that those scientists with a lower threshold of philosophical tolerance find plain annoying . How about ... "What is natural selection?" Now, before you launch into a lengthy narrative involving variation, fitness, differential reproductive success, inheritance, peacocks' tails, and all the rest, hold yer horses, chum. That's not what I mean. I mean ... "What IS natural selection?" What kind of beast is it? Is natural selection a law of nature? Is it a force? Is it something else? When God was sketching the blueprints of the architecture and furniture for the soon-to-be-created universe, so to speak, would we find natural selection included among the constituents, along with perhaps electrons, quarks, and the four (or is it three? ) fundamental forces of physics? Would a race of super-intelligent extraterrestrials be aware of natural selection? Or is natural selection a human invention? (And that in itself -- I hasten to add before our more excitable subscribers start trashing the joint -- would be no cause for concern.) Is it possible that natural selection, though useful to us for the explanatory power it yields, corresponds to nothing "out there" in the world? M. J. S. Hodge elaborates:- "Reflections on the demands of mathematical analysis have not, however, addressed all the ambiguities latent in the term 'natural selection'. A quite general issue has still received no canonical treatment : what kind of a thing is natural selection, anyway? A law, a principle, a force, a cause, an agent, or all or some of these? The view that natural selection is a law has been countered with the view that it is a principle, while that conclusion has been countered in turn by an insistence that it is neither (Reed, 1981; Byerly, 1983; Hodge, 1987b). Many textbooks talk of selection as a force, and the notion that evolutionary theory is a theory of forces has been defended explicitly (Sober, 1984a). However, if natural selection is in some serious sense a force, then one might expect a close analogue to mass in the theory of this force. But no plausible analogue for mass seems identifiable (Endler, 1986). A better tack may be to consider natural selection simply as a causal process and to define this process by specifying the conditions causally necessary and sufficient for its occurrence. A definition of natural selection as a cause is appropriate because evolutionary biologists today are still concerned, no less than Darwin was, with the definitional and evidential challenges set by the old (eighteenth-century) 'vera causa' ideal for all physical science: namely, defining a cause and then marshaling independent, empirical, evidential cases for the existence of that cause and for its adequacy and its responsibility for the effects it is taken to explain. It is, after all, in meeting these last three evidential challenges that upholders of the theory of natural selection can meet the old jibe that their theory is somehow a tautologous truism rather than an informative claim about the way the world works (Sober, 1984a; Hodge, 1987b, 1989). (Edited by CoIin) (Post deleted by CoIin ) (Post deleted by CoIin ) (Post deleted by CoIin ) (Post deleted by CoIin ) (Post deleted by CoIin ) | Science Chat Room Similar Conversations |